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Introduction
Accounting practice is guided by a comprehen-
sive set of generally accepted accounting princi-
ples (GAAP).  In many instances, there exist sev-
eral acceptable alternatives from which to choose 
in accounting for a particular business transac-
tion.  In theory, these alternatives are equally 
representative and equally informative to users of 
financial statements.  Since each of these alterna-
tives is intended to maintain the same degree of 
representational faithfulness, a choice of one ac-
counting alternative over another should not lead 
to a difference in subsequent behavior.  Business 
decisions which are made based on the account-
ing data generated through the use of one accept-
able alternative should not differ from decisions 
made based on another alternative.
Considerable accounting research has been con-
ducted in an effort to determine whether invest-
ment and credit decisions differ as a result of the 
choice of an accounting alternative.  In particu-
lar, a great deal of research has been conducted 
which investigates the reaction of the stock mar-
ket to changes between inventory valuation tech-
niques (FIFO vs. LIFO).  In general, this research 
has been conducted at a macro-level and has 
yielded mixed results.  (For a review of this lit-
erature, see Lindahl, Emby, and Ashton, 1988.) 
An interesting alternative to this type of research 
is to investigate investment and credit decisions 
in an experimental setting.  One particular ac-
counting situation which warrants empirical in-
vestigation is the area of accounting for purchase 
discounts in recording inventory cost.  GAAP al-
lows for two alternative treatments in the costing 
of inventory when cash discounts are available. 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the 
impact of these two accounting alternatives on 
decision making.
Theoretical Background and  
Hypothesis Development
As an alternative to expected utility theory, Kah-
neman and Tversky (1979) introduced a descrip-
tive model of decision making under risk, called 
prospect theory.  Through a series of experiments, 
Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated that an 
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individual’s decision making behavior may vary 
based on how an individual perceives the pos-
sible outcomes.  Specifically, the theory suggests 
that a decision maker is likely to choose a riskier 
alternative when he perceives that outcomes are 
potential losses than when the outcomes are po-
tential gains.
For example, Kahneman and Tversky asked de-
cision makers to choose between two “positive 
prospects.”  Individuals were asked if they would 
prefer (a) $3,000 or (b) an 80% probability of re-
ceiving $4,000.  The expected utility of the sec-
ond choice is $3,200 ($4,000 x 80) and is greater 
than the expected utility of the first alternative 
($3,000).  However, when the two alternatives 
were prospective gains, the subjects overwhelm-
ingly chose the sure chance of $3,000 rather than 
the 80% chance of receiving $4,000.  Kahneman 
and Tversky suggest that when decision makers 
must choose between positive prospects, they 
tend to be risk averse.
The authors also asked subjects to choose be-
tween two negative prospects.  Decision makers 
were asked to indicate whether they would pre-
fer (a) a sure loss of $3,000, or (b) an 80% prob-
ability of losing $4,000.  The expected loss of 
utility of the second choice is -$3,200 (-$4,000 
x 80%) and more negative than losing $3,000. 
Thus, expected utility theory predicts that a sure 
loss of $3,000 is preferable to an 80% chance 
of a $4,000 loss.  However, 92% of the subjects 
chose the second alternative instead of the first. 
Kahneman and Tversky conclude that, while de-
cision makers are risk averse when prospects are 
positive, they exhibit risk seeking behavior when 
prospects are negative.
Many business decisions which use accounting 
information are made under circumstances of 
uncertainty and are based, in part, on relative 
gains and losses.  Therefore, accounting settings 
appear to be a particularly appropriate setting to 
test the predictions of prospect theory.  To date, 
little accounting research has been conducted 
which has used prospect theory as its theoretical 
foundation.  The majority of the prospect theory 
research that has been conducted in accounting 
has been in the area of tax compliance (for exam-
ple, see Schepanski & Kelsey, 1990; and White, 
Harrison, & Harrell, 1993).  This research has 
demonstrated that taxpayers are more likely to 
claim a questionable deduction (risk seeking 
behavior) when it appears that they are in a tax 
liability position than when they are in a tax re-
fund position.
However, there appear to be other common ac-
counting situations in which prospect theory 
may be an appropriate model in describing ac-
counting decisions.  One application that appears 
to be particularly relevant is the method by which 
accountants are allowed to account for the cost 
of purchases of inventory.  Inventory represents a 
major cost on the income statement of most man-
ufacturing and merchandising firms.  Generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) allow 
for two acceptable alternatives in accounting for 
the cost of inventory purchases, the gross method 
and the net method.
Cash flow is critical to most vendors and sup-
pliers.  Therefore, these suppliers of inventory 
to merchandising and manufacturing firms fre-
quently provide for special credit discounts if a 
purchaser is willing to pay for an invoice within 
a relatively short period of time.  For example, 
credit terms are often stated 2/10; n/30, which 
means that the purchaser has the choice of a 2% 
discount if payment is made with 10 days of the 
invoice; otherwise, payment in full is required 
within 30 days.
GAAP has allowed for two accounting alterna-
tives for the purchaser.  The first alternative, the 
gross method, requires that the purchaser record 
the purchase at the invoice or gross amount.  If 
the purchaser chooses to pay within the discount 
period, he pays the discounted amount and the 
discount serves to reduce the cost of the pur-
chase.  The second method, the net method, as-
sumes that the purchaser takes advantage of all 
discounts.  Accordingly, all purchases are record-
ed at the discounted or net amount.  If the pur-
chaser chooses not to pay within the discount pe-
riod, he must record a loss for the amount of the 
discount.  The effect on net income is the same 
for both methods, and both are used in practice.
This choice among accounting alternatives, the 
gross method or the net method of accounting 
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for purchases, is an appropriate application to 
test the robustness of prospect theory.  Good 
cash management suggests that all cash dis-
counts should be taken.  However, it is conceiv-
able that, due to cash flow constraints, a manage-
ment accountant might be faced with a situation 
in which a discount period was expiring, and 
cash was not readily available to make payment 
and take advantage of the discount.  Suppose 
that two management accountants are faced 
with the decision described above.  Accountant 
A recorded his original purchase using the gross 
method.  If he chooses to make payment within 
the discount period, he records a purchase dis-
count and reduces the cost of his purchase.  Ac-
countant B recorded his original purchase using 
the net method.  If he elects to make payment 
within the discount period, no additional entry 
is necessary, since he originally recorded the pur-
chase at the net (invoice less discount) amount. 
The net effect both methods is to reduce the cost 
of the purchase.  Both of these prospects appear 
to be positive.
Alternatively, assume that both accountants 
choose not to make payment within the discount 
period.  Accountant A simply waits until the due 
date of the invoice and makes payment.  No ad-
ditional entry is necessary in this case since the 
original invoice was recorded at the gross amount. 
Accountant B recorded the original purchase 
and the associated liability at the net amount.  If 
he chooses to pay after the discount period, his li-
ability is now greater than the amount originally 
recorded.  GAAP requires that Accountant B 
record a loss for this difference.  It appears that 
Accountant B is faced with a negative prospect.
It is at this point that prospect theory applies. 
When an accountant chooses not to make pay-
ment within a discount period, the decision re-
sults in a reduction in net income.  This is true, 
whether the accountant has adopted the gross or 
the net method of accounting for purchases.  Ex-
pected utility theory suggests that, since the final 
wealth state is the same, payment behavior will 
not differ between the gross and the net meth-
ods.  However, prospect theory suggests that 
decision makers who have loss prospects (the net 
method) are more risk seeking.  Therefore, pros-
pect theory would suggest that accountants who 
face a loss will be more likely to take a risk and 
make payment during a discount period (even 
though cash may not be available) than accoun-
tants who do not face a loss.  Accordingly the fol-
lowing research hypothesis is proposed:
H1: Accountants who adopt the net 
method of accounting for inventory 
purchases will be more risk-seeking 
that accountants who adopt the gross 
method.
Mowen and Mowen (1986) demonstrated that 
the size of a discount in relation to the purchase 
price affects the likelihood that a decision maker 
will attempt to claim a discount.  Accordingly, a 
second hypothesis, designed to examine the im-
pact of materiality, is proposed.
H2: The materiality of a discount in rela-
tion to net income will affect the risk 
preferences of accountants.
Research Methodology
In order to examine the research hypotheses, a 
decision-making experiment, using practicing 
accountants was conducted.  A between-subjects 
2 x 2 factorial design was used.  (See Table 1.) 
The decision task required subjects to indicate 
the likelihood that he or she would make pay-
ment within a discount period under uncertain 
(and risky) conditions.  The subjects were ran-
domly assigned to one of the four treatment cells. 
(See Table 1.)
Subjects also were asked to provide general demo-
graphic information to determine whether the 
random assignment to treatments was success-
ful.  Appropriate statistical tests were conducted 
to determine whether any of these demographic 
characteristics were predictors of the dependent 
variable.  The results of these tests indicate that 
the probability assessment required in the experi-
mental task was not affected by any of the demo-
graphic characteristics.
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Subjects
Participants in the experiment were accoun-
tants who are experienced in similar decisions. 
A total of 119 subjects participated in the task. 
The subjects were Certified Public Accountants 
(CPAs) and Certified Management Accountants 
(CMAs) attending a Continuing Professional 
Education (CPE) seminar.  Participation in this 
project was voluntary.  In order to encourage the 
subjects to respond accurately and honestly, their 
anonymity was assured.
A summary of the demographic characteristics 
of the sample is provided in Table 2.  The sub-
jects reported an average work experience of 15.6 
years.  Almost all of the subjects (92.4%) were 
CPAs.  Slightly more than one-half (56.3%) of 
the subjects were employed as accountants in 
private industry.  The remainder (43.7%) were 
in public practice.  These demographic statistics 
suggest that the sample was well-qualified for the 
experimental task.
Research Instrument 
Appendices 1 and 2 provide examples of two of 
the four cells of the research design.  The first 
independent variable manipulated in the instru-
ment was the choice of the accounting alterna-
tives used for recording purchases.  Subjects were 
informed as to company policy regarding either 
the gross or net methods.  This accounting policy 
decision is generally made by the managing ac-
countant and, for the sake of consistency, gener-
ally does not vary between vendors.  The second 
experimental manipulation was the materiality 
of the discount.  This variable was manipulated 
in relation to net income.
Appendix 1 provides an example of the gross 
method/high materiality manipulation (Cell 
1 of Table 1).  Subjects were informed that the 
adopted accounting policy requires that all pur-
chases be accounted for using the gross method 
and that monthly net income has averaged 
$50,000.  Accordingly, the discount of $4,000 
is considered material ($4,000/$50,000 = 8% 
of income).  Appendix 2 is an example of the net 
method/low materiality manipulation (Cell 4 
of Table 1).  In this treatment, subjects were in-
formed that company accounting policy requires 
that all purchases be accounted for using the net 
method and that monthly net income has aver-
aged $200,000.  Accordingly, the discount is 
considered immaterial ($4,000/$200,000 = 2% 
of income).  Note that in Appendix 2, the sub-
ject must decide whether to make payment under 
risky conditions or recognize a loss.  In Appen-
TABLE 1 
Research Design 
Cell and Treatment Means
Materiality 
of  
Discount
Method of  
Recording  
Purchases
Treat-
ment 
Means
Gross Net
High 
8% of  
Net Income
31.41 
n=29
41.67 
n=30
36.63 
n = 59
Low 
2% of  
Net Income
23.67 
n=29
28.29 
n=31
25.77 
n = 60
Treatment  
Means
27.24 
n = 58
34.87 
n = 61
31.15 
n=119
Table 2 
Summary oF SubjecT demographicS
Gender 73 (61.3%) were male. 46 (38.7%) were female.
Age
Subjects reported a mean age 
of 42.3 years.  Age ranged 
from 23 to 67 years.
Experience
Subjects reported an average 
of 15.6 years of work 
experience.  Experience 
ranged from 1 to 44 years.
Certification
110 (92.4%) of the subjects 
reported that they were 
Certified Public Accountants. 
Current 
Employment
52 (43.7%) were currently 
employed in public 
accounting. 67 (56.3%) 
were currently employed in 
industry.
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dix 1, subjects do not face a loss decision if they 
choose not to make payment.
The experimental task required the subjects to 
indicate the probability that they would make a 
payment in order to take advantage of a discount 
when there existed some uncertainty as to the 
availability of cash.  The instructions indicated 
that if the subject chose to make payment, he 
would have to depend upon the cash receipts of 
the following business day to cover the check. 
Participants also were informed that if the check 
was returned due to insufficient funds, the sup-
plier would enforce severe penalties.  As a result, 
the decision faced by the subjects could be viewed 
as an ethical dilemma.  Even though the practice 
of “riding the float” is common, it is considered 
by many to be an unethical practice.
Due to the possible presence of an ethical dilem-
ma, a second research instrument was given to 
the subjects.  This second instrument asked the 
subjects to indicate the degree to which the case 
presented an ethical conflict.  (See Appendix 3.) 
This multidimensional ethics scale was adapted 
from the work of Flory et al. (1992) and McCoy 
(1994).  In order to eliminate the possibility that 
the ethics scale would influence the subjects as-
sessment of the probability of payment, this por-
tion of the instrument was completed only after 
the probability of payment had been reported. 
The participants completed the probability of 
payment instrument and placed the instrument 
in an envelope.  Then the subjects completed the 
ethical conflict instrument and placed it in an-
other envelope.  Both envelopes were returned 
to the administrator who coded the envelopes to 
ensure the responses were appropriately matched. 
Results
The following linear model was used in the anal-
ysis of the experimental results:
 Y  = B0 + B1X1 + B2X2 + B3X3 +e  , 
where:
 Y  =  the likelihood that payment will be 
made,
 X1  =  treatment 1  -  Accounting alterna-
tive (Gross or Net method),
 X2  =  treatment 2  -  Materiality of dis-
count (High or Low),
 X3  =  the perceived ethical conflict pre-
sented in the case, and
	 e  =  error term.
While  X1 and X2  were categorical variables rep-
resenting the two levels of the two experimental 
manipulations, X3 was a continuous variable and 
was included in the model as a covariate (Tabich-
nick & Fidell, 1989).
Tables 1 and 3 provide a summary of the results 
of the analysis.  Hypothesis 1 predicted that ac-
countants who adopt the net method of account-
ing for purchases would be more likely to exhibit 
risk-seeking behavior.  In the present study, risk-
seeking behavior was defined as an increased 
probability that payment for an invoice would 
be made during the discount period even when 
the availability of sufficient cash was uncertain. 
Table 1 indicates that the mean probability re-
ported by subjects assigned to the Net treatments 
was 34.87 (on a scale of 0 to 100).  For subjects 
assigned to the Gross treatments, the mean prob-
ability was 27.24.  While this is directionally 
consistent with the prediction of H1, Table 3 
indicates that this difference is, at best, only mar-
ginally significantly (F = 2.71; Prob > F = .1025). 
Accordingly, weak support is provided for H1.
The second hypothesis predicted that the larger 
the purchase discount in relation to total month-
ly sales and net income, the greater the likelihood 
the subjects would exhibit risk-seeking behavior. 
Table 1 reports a mean likelihood of payment of 
25.77 (on a scale of 0 to 100) for subjects in the 
Low Materiality treatment.  Subjects in the High 
Materiality treatment reported a mean of 36.63. 
Table 3 indicates that the mean response of sub-
jects in the High Materiality treatments differ 
significantly from subjects in the Low Material-
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ity treatments (F = 5.56; Prob > F = .0201).  Ac-
cordingly, these results provide support for H2.
Table 3 also reports the covariate results.  To con-
trol for any variance in the dependent variable 
that could result from the ethical nature of the 
likelihood assessment required in the case, the 
perceived ethical conflict, a continuous variable, 
was included in the model.  As seen in Table 3, 
the degree to which the decision presented an 
ethical conflict was closely related to the likeli-
hood of payment (F = 39.36; Prob > F = .0001). 
Specifically, subjects were less likely to make 
payment within the discount period when they 
perceived that the payment presented an ethical 
conflict.
In summary, the experiment was designed to de-
termine whether the choice of the net method 
of accounting for purchases discounts would 
increase the probability of risky decision behav-
ior.  The results of the experiment provide weak 
support for this proposition.  In addition, the ex-
periment examined the impact of the material-
ity of a purchases discount on decision behavior. 
The results indicate that the larger the discount 
in relation to income, the greater the likelihood 
of payment.  Finally, when the case presented an 
ethical dilemma to subjects, they were less likely 
to make payment.
Conclusions
Prospect theory proposes that decision mak-
ing behavior will vary according to the framing 
of potential outcomes.  Specifically, the theory 
predicts that when an outcome is viewed as a po-
tential gain, a decision maker will tend to be risk 
averse.  Alternatively, when an outcome is viewed 
as a potential loss, a decision maker will be more 
prone to risk-seeking behavior.  This study exam-
ined the tenets of prospect theory in an account-
ing setting.
The results of the study provide limited support 
these propositions.  Subjects who faced a poten-
tial loss appeared to be more likely to make pay-
ment for an invoice under risky conditions than 
subjects who did not face such a loss (a likelihood 
assessment of 34.87 compared to a likelihood of 
27.24).  While this difference is only marginally 
significant, the differences are in the predicted 
direction.  In addition, the results indicate that 
subjects were more willing to make payment un-
der risky conditions when the materiality of the 
discounts was greater.  Between-cell contrasts in-
dicate that the likelihood assessment of subjects 
in the Net/High Materiality treatment differed 
significantly from the mean response of subjects 
in the remaining three treatments (F = 5.20; 
Prob > F = .0245).  This suggests that the risk-
TABLE 3 
Tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 
Analysis of Variance Results
Dependent Variable:  Probability of making payment within discount period
Source DF Sum of Squares F-Value Pr > F R-Square   
Model 3 30404.285   15.88   0.0001    0.292875
Error           115   73408.993    
Corrected 
Total 118 103813.277
 Source         DF Sum of Squares F-Value Pr > F
 Main effects: 
 GROSS/NET       1      1729.706   2.71    0.1025
 MATERIAL        1      3549.477 5.56 0.0201
 Covariate:
 ETHICAL 1 25125.102 39.36 0.0001
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seeking behavior was most pronounced when the 
possibility of a material loss existed.
In addition to the findings related to the two 
experimental treatments, the study suggests that 
the perception of an ethical conflict by subjects 
significantly impacts the likelihood assessment 
made by subjects.  When subjects viewed the de-
cision to “ride the float” as unethical, they were 
significantly less likely to exhibit risk-taking be-
havior.  This finding suggests that ethical consid-
erations may have some impact on the robustness 
of prospect theory.  Additional research is war-
ranted to investigate this possibility.
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APPENDIX 1
Gross Method / High Materiality
Assume that you are the controller for a mid-sized 
merchandising firm.  For the past year, monthly 
sales for your firm have averaged $500,000 and 
monthly net income has averaged $50,000.  As 
controller, your responsibilities include the ap-
proval of cash disbursements. 
At present, a large portion of the merchandise 
that you sell is purchased from one manufacturer. 
Accordingly, payments to this manufacturer are 
a significant portion of your monthly disburse-
ments.  Based on the volume of your merchan-
dise purchases and the credit history you have 
established with your supplier, you have been 
granted excellent credit terms.  At present, your 
credit terms with your supplier are 4/10, n/30. 
Specifically, you are granted a 4% discount on 
purchases when payment is made within 10 days 
of delivery.  Otherwise, the total amount (gross) 
of the invoice is due within thirty days.  For your 
benefit, your supplier has set up an account at a 
local bank for you to deposit your invoice pay-
ments.  This convenience allows you to wait until 
the afternoon of the 10th day after delivery to 
make payment and still receive credit within the 
discount period.  
Realizing the significance of this discount and 
the generous credit terms, you have always paid 
within the discount period.  Ten days ago, you 
receive delivery of Invoice #201, an unusually 
large order.  The gross amount of this invoice was 
$100,000. 
In order to pay Invoice #201 within the discount 
period and claim the discount of $4,000, payment 
must be deposited in your supplier’s account this 
afternoon.  Upon analysis, you determine that 
you do not have sufficient cash available to make 
payment today.  In addition, you have no other 
immediate means to obtain cash.  
In the past, your supplier has allowed you to take 
the 4% discount as long as you deposit your pay-
ment into the supplier’s account during normal 
business hours on the 10th day after delivery. 
You have found, however, that if you wait until 
late afternoon to make payment,  the check is not 
deducted from your firm’s checking account un-
til the following evening.  Upon consideration, 
you determine that you could make payment to-
day, and cover the payment with tomorrow’s cash 
receipts, assuming the anticipated cash receipts 
are equal to those of a typical business day.  
However, if you make payment today and the 
anticipated cash receipts do not materialize, your 
bank will not cover the check and will return it to 
your supplier unpaid.  Your supplier has specified, 
in your credit agreement, that if any payment is 
returned by the bank for insufficient funds, your 
credit terms (and discount) will be cancelled and 
all future purchases will be shipped C.O.D. 
In accordance with your company’s accounting 
policies, all merchandise purchases are recorded 
and posted at the gross amount.  Therefore, if you 
make payment today (within the discount peri-
od), you would record the following entry:
Accounts Payable 100,000 
 Purchases Discount  4,000 
 Cash   96,000
If you wait until the end of the month to make 
payment, you would record the following entry:
Accounts Payable 100,000 
 Cash  100,000
Given the circumstances described above, what 
is the likelihood that you would make payment 
today? 
VERY VERY 
UNLIKELY LIKELY
0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9------10
PLEASE INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING A 
SLASH (/) ON THE LINE ABOVE.
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APPENDIX 2
Net Method / Low Materiality
Assume that you are the controller for a mid-sized mer-
chandising firm.  For the past year, monthly sales for your 
firm have averaged $2,000,000 and monthly net income 
has averaged $200,000.  As controller, your responsibili-
ties include the approval of cash disbursements. 
At present, a large portion of the merchandise that you 
sell is purchased from one manufacturer.  Accordingly, 
payments to this manufacturer are a significant portion 
of your monthly disbursements.  Based on the volume 
of your merchandise purchases and the credit history 
you have established with your supplier, you have been 
granted excellent credit terms.  At present, your credit 
terms with your supplier are 4/10, n/30.  Specifically, you 
are granted a 4% discount on purchases when payment 
is made within 10 days of delivery.  Otherwise, the total 
amount (gross) of the invoice is due within thirty days. 
For your benefit, your supplier has set up an account at 
a local bank for you to deposit your invoice payments. 
This convenience allows you to wait until the afternoon 
of the 10th day after delivery to make payment and still 
receive credit within the discount period.   Realizing the 
significance of this discount and the generous credit 
terms, you have always paid within the discount period. 
Ten days ago, you receive delivery of Invoice #201, an 
unusually large order.  The gross amount of this invoice 
was $100,000. 
In order to pay Invoice #201 within the discount period 
and claim the discount of $4,000, payment must be de-
posited in your supplier’s account this afternoon.  Upon 
analysis, you determine that you do not have sufficient 
cash available to make payment today.  In addition, you 
have no other immediate means to obtain cash.
  In the past, your supplier has allowed you to take the 
4% discount as long as you deposit your payment into 
the supplier’s account during normal business hours on 
the 10th day after delivery.  You have found, however, 
that if you wait until late afternoon to make payment,  the 
check is not deducted from your firm’s checking account 
until the following evening.  Upon consideration, you de-
termine that you could make payment today, and cover 
the payment with tomorrow’s cash receipts, assuming 
the anticipated cash receipts are equal to those of a typi-
cal business day.  
However, if you make payment today and the anticipated 
cash receipts do not materialize, your bank will not cover 
the check and will return it to your supplier unpaid.  Your 
supplier has specified, in your credit agreement, that 
if any payment is returned by the bank for insufficient 
funds, your credit terms (and discount) will be cancelled 
and all future purchases will be shipped C.O.D. 
In accordance with your company’s accounting policies, 
all merchandise purchases are recorded and posted at 
the net amount.  Therefore, if you make payment today 
(within the discount period), you would record the fol-
lowing entry:
Accounts Payable 96,000 
 Cash  96,000
If you wait until the end of the month to make payment, 
you would record the following entry:
Accounts Payable 96,000 
 Loss on Forfeited Discounts  4,000 
 Cash  100,000
Given the circumstances described above, what is the 
likelihood that you would make payment today? 
VERY VERY 
UNLIKELY LIKELY
0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9------10
PLEASE INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING A 
SLASH (/) ON THE LINE ABOVE.
PLEASE INDICATE ANSWER BY  
PLACING A SLASH (/)  
ON THE LINE ABOVE.
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Please circle the number corresponding to the extent to which you believe you are presented 
with an ethical conflict in the above case.
No 
Conflict 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
A Great Deal of 
Conflict
Suppose you decide to pay the invoice today. Please evaluate this action.
Unethical  0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9 Ethical
Acceptable to 
My Employer 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Unacceptable to My 
Employer
Violates an 
Unwritten 
Contract
0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9 Does Not Violates an Unwritten Contract
Traditionally 
Acceptable 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Not Traditionally 
Acceptable
Just 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Unjust
Morally 
Right 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Not Morally Right
Culturally 
Acceptable 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Not Culturally 
Acceptable
Violates an 
Unspoken 
Promise
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Does Not Violate an Unspoken Promise
